Peering Policy

süc // dacor operates an open peering policy, however we expect peering partners to meet the technical and operational criteria listed below. To establish peering with us, please contact peering@dacor.de.

süc // dacor maintains a PeeringDB record available at http://as28876.peeringdb.com/

  • süc // dacor uses hot-potato routing and does not honor MED-values.
  • süc // dacor operates the AS 28876.
  • Peers are expected to peer using the same as-number on all peering points.
  • Peering partners should announce a consistent set of prefixes across all peering points.
  • Peering in multiple locations is preferred, but not required. Peers are however expected to peer at all common peering points.
  • süc // dacor supports but does not require MD5-Authentication of BGP Sessions.
  • süc // dacor prefers direct BGP-Sessions over routeserver peerings for monitoring and policy reasons.
  • Peers must maintain a 24×7 Network Operations Center or provide a 24×7 emergency contact capable of troubleshooting BGP-related problems.
  • Peers must not configure any form default route that is directed at süc // dacor.
  • Peers must cooperate in the troubleshooting of any peering related issues and denial of
    service attacks.
  • Peers must not re-advertise routes learned from süc // dacor to other peering partners
    and upstream networks.
  • Peers are encouraged to maintain an up-to-date PeeringDB record.
  • Peers should aggregate route announcements as much as possible.
  • Peers are expected to filter their clients to reject both unauthorized BGP announcements as well as IP traffic with invalid source addresses.
  • Peerings should be established via IPv6 as well as IPv4.
  • süc // dacor encourages to follow BCP-381 1 and RFC 74542 2

süc // dacor reserves the right to suspend peering for an indefinite period of time should any form of network abuse be verified to take place via the peering interconnect. Examples of abuse are but are not limited to:

  • Denial of Service attacks
  • Setting default-route towards süc // dacor
  • Leaking routes learned from süc // dacor to peering partners or upstream networks

Links
1 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3704
2 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7454